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ABSTRACT 
Nation states are increasingly bolstering their defensive and offensive cyber capabilities 
to launch and deter politically motivated cyber attacks. This does not only affect political 
processes, institutions, and election outcomes, but also a state’s critical infrastructure, economy, 
and society. Recent escalations and cyber attacks on power grids, parliaments, electoral 
campaigns, and financial institutions have made governments more aware of the double-edged 
sword presented by emerging cyber capabilities wielded by nation states. A new layer has been 
added to conflict prevention between states, i.e. international diplomacy, confidence-building 
measures and deterrence in cyber space. In this paper, we argue that stand-alone deterrence and 
stand-alone appeasement cannot solve the arising cross-national cyber conflict and prevent a 
cyber arms race. Only a concerted effort to combine diplomatic and deterring strategies can lead 
to an acceptable status quo in international cyber relations. 
Keywords: Cyber Diplomacy; Cyber Deterrence; Conflict Prevention; International 
Cyber Relations; Cyber Warfare; CBMs. 
INTRODUCTION 
The world faces an escalating threat from cyber weapons, which are becoming increasingly 
potent corresponding with our growing dependence on cyber infrastructure. Modern 
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technological advances, enabled by cyber innovations, have impacted every facet of life, to the 
degree that governments, individuals and businesses depend on the digital world for day-to-day 
functions. Simultaneously, the threat landscape has broadened with each cyber innovation, and 
the consequences of attacks have escalated from information loss, to financial loss, to loss of life 
and property. Nation states have recognized the potential of cyber attacks for military use and are 
actively developing their digital arsenals, which could lead to a cyber arms race. The result of 
such an arms race would negate the economic and social gains of cyber space. There is a need 
for a combined, comprehensive approach of international diplomacy and deterrence to mitigate 
the cyber arms race before it leads to a catastrophic incident.  
The development of sophisticated cyber weapons disrupts the implementation of traditional 
approaches to avert conflict and to prevent attacks. During the Cold War, deterrence first became 
a major theoretical concept to rational decision-making in tense political situations and in 
relation to cost-benefit calculations. However, historically, deterrence theory was not the only 
focus of the players in the international arena – diplomacy, open and secret negotiations and 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) helped to keep the balance of power when dissuasion and 
deterrence either did not work, or when diplomacy was needed in addition to deterrence.   
Both the conception and deployment of cyber deterrence strategies and confidence-building 
measures has become more difficult, for a number of reasons: (1) Cyber attacks and exploits are 
relatively cheap and can have significant impact, (2) Due to secrecy and a lack of transparency in 
the cyber domain, nation states do not disclose their capabilities, making it harder to deter 
adversaries or to cooperate with one another, and (3) Attributing cyber attacks with 
overwhelming confidence is almost impossible. Hence, political processes and institutions, 
economies and populations are at risk of being influenced and compromised by adversaries. 
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This paper examines the deterrence of nation states, and the diplomatic efforts between nation 
states. While outlining the challenges and advantages of transferring deterrence theory and 
confidence-building measures to the cyber realm, this paper mainly aims at elaborating on the 
intertwined nature of both approaches. Deterrence does not work without diplomatic effort, trust 
and credibility, and cooperative advances towards political and strategic adversaries do not yield 
positive long-term results without defensive and dissuasive strategies in place. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive approach is necessary to prevent conflict in cyberspace. 
In order to understand the connection between deterrence theory and international diplomacy, we 
first lay out the key elements of cyber diplomacy and cyber deterrence. The subsequent 
discussion addresses the challenges and opportunities in combining cyber diplomacy and cyber 
deterrence to more effectively prevent politically motivated attacks. 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER DIPLOMACY 
International diplomacy and confidence-building measures in cyberspace still fall short of 
effective implementation. Few bi-lateral treaties exist and despite sustained efforts, agreements 
on norms (and taboos) and CBMs by international and regional organizations such as the United 
Nations’ Groups of Governmental Experts (UN GGEs), the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), and the ASEAN Regional Forum remain elusive. 
Confidence-Building Measures 
The content of CBMs that these organizations propose or have already implemented overlaps 
significantly, however, the vocabulary used in their agreements and reports varies widely and 
can be a hindrance to successful communication between stakeholders (Radunovic 2017: 5/6). 
The UN GGE report of 2015 lays the foundation for binding norms and CBMs for the 
international community, and encompasses, inter alia, the following points: To respect state 
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sovereignty and international law, including the agreement to abide by the principle of non-
intervention, to protect and refrain from targeting critical infrastructure, to enhance information-
sharing and cooperation of incident response teams, and capacity building (United Nations 
General Assembly 2015). The OSCE has also formulated a framework for its participating 
States, focusing more on the necessity to find a common language and communication channels, 
bodies and committees for co-operation to facilitate the exchange of information and to share 
best practices (Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
2016, 2017, Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
2012, 2013, 2016). The Atlantic Council identifies four broad categories for CBMs: 
Collaboration, crisis management, restraint, and engagement measures (Healey et al. 2014).  It 
proposes “joint international investigations into major cyber incidents” (ibid.: 4), communication 
channels between nation states including the alignment of cyber emergency response teams 
(CERTs), hotlines and norms (ibid.). 
Bi-Lateral Agreements 
While numerous international and regional projects and discussions on CBMs are under way, bi-
lateral agreements have not been as prevalent in the debate. The United States Department of 
State has summarized a few key aspects of Russia’s, China’s, Brazil’s and India’s cyber 
strategies and where they differ in their views on international cyber norms and taboos 
(Department of State International 2016). This helps the United States (US) to identify the areas 
in which to deter actions and behaviors of these states and to identify areas in which diplomacy 
and co-operation should be the preferred option. The US has bi-lateral cyber agreements with 
China, Russia and India, while China and Russia as well as India and Russia also signed 
agreements. Whether bi-lateral treaties foster or rather hinder further international co-operation is 
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contested. They could “feed into and fuel each other” (Radunovic 2017: 12) or “create suspicion 
and diminish confidence of those not directly involved” (Pawlak 2016: 149). 
There is a need in the international community for a cyber rulebook, with private companies such 
as Microsoft even calling for a “Digital Geneva Convention” (Smith 2017). In 2013, twenty 
international law scholars and practitioners published the Tallinn Manual, an important milestone 
for the development of binding norms and rules as part of international law (Schmitt 2013). So 
far, however, the Tallinn Manual is merely a scientific effort, as nation states struggle to find 
common ground even on the bi-lateral level.  
DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE 
There is a wide range of literature on deterrence theory in cyberspace. This section will briefly 
introduce its two main categories, deterrence by retaliation and deterrence by denial, and will 
discuss the addition of two more cyber-specific dimensions, entanglement, and norms and 
taboos. Deterrence is generally defined as “dissuading someone from doing something by 
making them believe that the costs to them will exceed their expected benefit“ (Nye Jr. 2017). 
Deterrence by retaliation revolves around the basic notion of punishing an attacker by 
threatening or executing a counterstrike that will make an attack less feasible and more costly for 
the attacker, hence reducing the incentives for aggression (Goodman 2010).  
Cyber deterrence by denial can be interpreted in two different ways: Building defense structures, 
resilience and capacity to recover, as well as denying adversaries access to resources, knowledge 
and hardware. Denial by defense works in a way that anticipates attacks, knowing the 
capabilities and preferred attack methods of adversaries, and finds ways to make systems more 
secure. This means, generally speaking, the detection of vulnerabilities and lowering risk. By 
making a state’s systems and infrastructure less penetrable and more secure, the adversary’s cost-
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benefit ratio is altered, increasing their effort, resources and time involved to attack and reducing 
the rewards of such an attack. Denial by restricted access is less feasible in today’s globalised 
world, however, according to Kenneth Geers (2010), it can be successful, given that three basic 
requirements are fulfilled: capability, communication and credibility: “Deterrence by denial is a 
strategy in which an adversary is physically prevented from acquiring a threatening technology” 
(Geers 2010). Geers admits that this interpretation of deterrence by denial has better chances of 
success in the prevention of nuclear war rather than a cyber war since denying access to nuclear 
technologies and materials is much easier than restricting access to cyber technologies and tools. 
Entanglement, Norms and Taboos 
There are two more factors of deterrence that can be viewed as independent influencers: 
Entanglement, and norms and taboos. Some scholars believe these to be “simply different 
instances of deterrence by retaliation” (Taddeo 2017) and that “[t]he commonality between all 
[..] is the reinforcement of deterrence by punishment. Each occurs in a slightly different way, but 
all seek to punish and curb behavior by adding a social cost” (Ryan 2017). Deterrence by 
entanglement is, indeed, an indicator of deterrence by retaliation, more specifically, of the 
success or failure of deterrence by retaliation. The more entangled two actors are on the 
economic and political level, the more likely it is that they can be deterred by retaliation. 
When looking at deterrence by norms and taboos, however, the comparison to deterrence by 
retaliation is not as accurate. Norms and taboos are essentially diplomatic tools and a matter of 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements. The taboo of attacking a state’s critical infrastructure, for 
instance, is the result of international co-operation. This norm, however, seems to only apply to 
adversaries with relatively equal standing and capabilities, not nation states that are in a superior 
position or within their sphere of influence, as in the case of the Russian attack on the Ukrainian 
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electric power grid (Connell and Vogler 2017; Lee, Assante and Conway 2016). The assumption 
is that more deterrence is needed so as to ensure that the threshold of credible retaliation cannot 
be crossed. Deterring by norms and taboos, however, requires not only fear of punishment and 
consequences should they be ignored, but also a common environment for these norms and 
taboos to exist in, and measures of trust and confidence. Norms and taboos are, thus, a 
component of deterrence as well as international cooperation and diplomacy. 
DETERRENCE AND DIPLOMACY: A COMBINED APPROACH 
Deterrence theory has always been a matter of debate between historians, political and social 
scientists, especially with regard to its stand-alone effects. Some may argue that deterrence alone 
can be effective, especially when the nation state exerting power is superior in terms of their 
capabilities. The failure of deterrence, then, in turn, is seen as a consequence of its low intensity 
or non-credible implementation and execution. This is a dangerous and erroneous assumption. 
Robert Kagan (2016; 2017), in this context, claims that sophisticated, high-end deterrence works 
as long as the adversary is afraid to operate on a high level in an openly aggressive manner, and 
as long as high-end deterrence is credible and there is no doubt about possible retaliatory actions.  
Applying Traditional Approaches to Cyber Space 
In the context of cyber, the dimensions of both deterrence and diplomacy are widened and have 
to be understood before analyzing their intertwined nature. Traditional approaches limit 
retaliatory, defensive and diplomatic responses to the non-digital world. Options may include 
economic sanctions, political disengagement by closing embassies and ending diplomatic 
relations, and even kinetic responses, military engagement and anti-missile systems. The nature 
of cyber space, however, enables complex hybrid response options. Hence, the added dimension 
of cyber space allows deterrence and diplomacy to be carried out in a cross-domain field: 
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Traditional military threats, for example, can be responded to in the cyber domain. Cyber threats 
can be responded to in the cyber domain or the traditional military, economic and diplomatic 
domain. It is important to understand that cyber deterrence and cyber diplomacy are not solely 
restricted to the digital sphere. 
The attempt to transfer the traditional comprehensive approach to the cyber sphere has to happen 
in a comprehensive manner as well, considering both deterrence and diplomacy in their 
interdependence. Conjunction of both concepts is necessary, however, the importance and 
relevance of the specific variables involved differs. It is inevitable to weigh the importance of 
these variables according to the context and the nature of the threat. In order to make the 
arguments more tangible, we examined two cases, i.e. the US-China cyber treaty and alleged 
Russian influence in the 2016 US presidential election. 
US – China Cyber Espionage Agreement 
In the run-up to the 2015 US–China Cyber Espionage Agreement, the Obama administration had 
repeatedly stressed that the US was not engaging in economic cyber espionage for commercial 
benefits and that the theft of intellectual property by China had to come to an end (Brown and 
Yung 2017a; Obama 2015). For the examination of the general thesis of this paper, it is crucial to 
look at the unsuccessful approaches that were introduced in the years leading up to the treaty, 
and the reasons for the relative success that manifested itself in the bi-lateral cyber agreement. 
As deterrent measures, the US indicted five members of the People’s Liberation Army in 2014, 
an action which was ultimately unsuccessful at deterring the threat (Sanger 2015). Again, in 
2015, the US made a credible threat of imposing economic sanctions, an action which played a 
major role in bringing China to the negotiation table (Nakashima 2015). The fear of reputational 
and economic damage in combination with years of cooperative engagement (Department of 
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State International 2016) resulted in a bi-lateral agreement to lower risk of future theft and to 
mitigate that reputational damage: “Another reason for China’s willingness to enter into the 
agreement […] is the growing reluctance of U.S. companies to locate in China, particularly in the 
case of research and development centers. An increasingly unfavorable reputation regarding the 
theft of intellectual property from companies located in China may have been dampening 
enthusiasm for continued investment in China. In the long run, this could be a blow to China’s 
continued economic development” (Brown and Yung 2017b). 
There are three factors that are unique to the US - China scenario: A low likelihood of kinetic 
military action, high economic entanglement, and potential reputational damage. All three 
variables include soft and hard power components, which form a complex picture of US - China 
cyber relations. If the threat of commercial cyber espionage, in this specific case, was solely 
deterred or solely appeased, the cost for both actors would have inevitably gone up. 
Appeasement would have led to a continuous or elevated frequency of cyber attacks by China, 
thus raising the cost for American companies and citizens. Deterrence would have led to 
economic sanctions against China, thus threatening the interdependent economic prosperity of 
both and raising the reputational cost for economic investment in China (Brown & Yung 2017b). 
Scientific scholars argue that the relatively positive outcome of this case is owed to successful 
deterrence by retaliation, denial and, most importantly, entanglement: “Unlike the single strand 
of military interdependence that linked the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the 
United States, China, and other countries are entangled in multiple networks. China, for example, 
would itself lose from an attack that severely damaged the American economy, and visa versa“ 
(Nye Jr. 2010: 16f.). Since China is the United States’ largest trading partner (United States 
Census Bureau 2018), using economic deterrence measures was successful in leading both 
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parties to a diplomatic agreement. Conversely, the Russian Federation has proven to be less 
vulnerable to such deterrence measures because of its relatively low engagement in international 
trade with the U.S. (ibid.). Thus, the composition of deterrent and diplomatic measures has to be 
adjusted on a case-to-case basis. 
Surely, the extension of deterrence theory to include economic and political entanglement is 
important, and can, in part, explain why China agreed to a cyber security treaty. It is evident, 
however, that the diplomatic factor can also not be ignored in the analysis of this case: In 
traditional threat scenarios, the outcome of a deterrence or diplomatic effort would be physically 
visible and violations immediately observable through the removal of missiles or heavy 
machinery, disarmament agreements, the retreat of soldiers and so forth. In cyberspace, an 
agreement such as the one between China and the US requires trust and confidence that the 
adversary will abide by the rules and comply with the treaty. Consequently, even with low levels 
of trust between the two nation states in this case, a bi-lateral agreement was, nevertheless, seen 
as the best alternative to economic sanctions. Years after the agreement was signed, there are 
now indications that the diplomatic efforts combined with deterrence by retaliation and 
entanglement, have indeed significantly reduced economic cyber espionage for commercial gain, 
and that future agreements could build on and improve upon the US – China Cyber Espionage 
Agreement (Harold 2016; Louie 2017). 
External Influences in the 2016 US Presidential Election 
During the 2016 US presidential elections, the Russian Federation launched a well-planned 
massive social media campaign to sow discord by spreading distrust for candidates and the 
political system in the United States. According to the Mueller indictment (United States of 
America v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al. 2018), the planning cost millions of dollars and 
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involved scores of Russian operatives who were on US soil. The campaign involved use of social 
media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, where bot accounts were set up 
for disseminating misleading,  politically sensitive information, for instance, promoting Donald 
Trump and disparaging Hillary Clinton. The operatives infiltrated the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s networks by 
injecting malware which allowed them to install keyloggers and steal passwords of campaign 
aides and servers. Once in the network, hackers were able to steal confidential documents and 
emails from the DNC servers. They released the stolen information strategically to discredit 
Hillary Clinton and derail her campaign.  
In the case of Russia interfering with the 2016 US election, both deterrence and diplomacy 
failed, despite warnings by the Obama administration that further action by the Russian 
government would have consequences, and despite efforts to covertly increase the cost for 
Russia to launch attacks (Landler and Sanger 2016; Ewing 2018). With regard to deterrence, 
retaliatory threats were largely ineffective due to a lack of credibility and entanglement between 
the US and Russia. Additionally, the US lacked defensive capabilities, lowering the effectiveness 
of deterrence by denial. At the same time, diplomatic responses, such as expelling diplomatic 
personnel, and face to face conversations and warnings between US president Barack Obama and 
Russian president Vladimir Putin were likely perceived as non-credible, low risk threats by the 
Russian Federation (Carson 2017). To protect itself in the future, the US will need to invest in its 
defensive capabilities, thus improving deterrence by denial measures. This will include 
improving the security of government and campaign networks and servers, as well as raising 
awareness amongst diplomats and politicians like Hillary Clinton on how to best protect their 
data. A combination of securing networks and building defensive structures for political 
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institutions, and entering a diplomatic dialogue with the Russian Federation on norms and taboos 
on the use of cyber technologies will be the first step towards normalizing their cyber relations. 
While the tools for launching this Russian operation are not novel, the planning, scale, and 
coordination of the operation was astoundingly meticulous, making it so successful. While 
election meddling and its impact on this campaign in the 2016 US elections is not in dispute 
anymore, attribution of the individual hackers and their sponsors is not completely clear. Therein 
lies the problem; with uncertainty in identifying sponsors and perpetrators of such activities, it is 
difficult to deter them in the future as discussed in the following section.  
DISCUSSION 
We argue that deterrence and diplomacy have to go hand in hand in order to prevent a cyber war 
or escalation of the use of cyber weapons. The adoption of traditional theories to the cyber realm 
is under way; however, this process is accompanied by doubt and concern about its feasibility 
and effectiveness. Cyber weapons are inexpensive and can be disseminated fast, the attribution 
of attacks is hard, and secrecy around available tools, intelligence and knowledge blur the 
potential defensive and offensive possibilities. 
Attribution is a problem for both cyber deterrence and diplomacy. In order to identify a measured 
diplomatic, economic, military or cyber response to an incident without becoming the aggressor 
or creating new adversaries, attribution is key (Bendiek and Metzger 2015). Appropriate 
retaliation as well as diplomatic consequences to cyber attacks have long been considered 
problematic due to the ambiguities of their origins. It has been argued that attribution in 
cyberspace is, in fact, not impossible anymore (ibid.). Yet the risk of escalation and a cyber arms 
race remains. In the realm of diplomacy and CBMs, the creation of a multi-lateral cyber 
adjudication and attribution council has been proposed (Healey et al. 2014), although 
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cooperation on this level seems quite unlikely in the current international atmosphere. When 
looking at the attribution problem as a shared obstacle to both effective deterrence and effective 
diplomacy, the combined approach might help to find creative solutions. Norms and regulations 
could, for instance, provide a framework for binding agreements, which, in turn, will make 
retaliatory and defensive deterrence more feasible, as the accepted norms can be used to facilitate 
attribution and cooperation to identify culprits and enhance the credibility of deterrence. 
Attribution is not the only challenge with regard to cyber deterrence and CBMs. Nation states – 
both the ones carrying out attacks and the ones affected by them – operate under a level of 
confidentiality which was not as prevalent in the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence by retaliation as 
well as by denial was largely based on the credibility of the claim that a state actor had the 
capabilities and the know-how to retaliate or defend itself against an attack. Similarly, CBMs, in 
the traditional sense, would include clear and strict rules, norms and practices, meaning that a 
state actor could be called out on a particular action or a certain behavior that was not in 
compliance with these agreed-upon rules and norms. It is not easy to hide incidents or defensive 
military systems in a non-digital, physical environment. In cyberspace, however, secrecy appears 
to be an inherent method of deterrence and cooperation, both in a negative and positive sense. 
“No national strategy exists for deterring cyberattacks by retaliation [..], with little indication 
available as to what sorts of retaliation are planned or under development” (Morgan 2010, 57). In 
addition to complicating deterrence by retaliation, deterrence by denial in cyberspace shifts from 
highly visible movements of heavy machinery and the deployment of anti-missile systems to the 
secret development of cyber weapons. If the defender knows the capabilities of the adversary, 
vectors of attack can be closed at relatively low cost and high speed compared to the kinetic and 
economic sphere, creating a strong incentive to keep cyber capabilities and know-how secret. 
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This is a challenge, as cyber deterrence relies increasingly on psychological manipulation and 
signaling of capabilities that are not visible, making it more difficult to convey credible 
retaliatory and defensive capabilities. Diplomatic advances, in turn, become harder to achieve, as 
secrecy, anonymity and difficulty of attribution complicate confidence-building and trust. 
To facilitate the comprehensive approach suggested in this paper, it is important to note that 
cyber conflicts cannot be equated with military or economic confrontations, especially regarding 
methods of conflict prevention and resolution. Depending on the variables outlined above, 
including economic and political entanglement, defensive capabilities and power relations 
between the conflict parties, an appropriate balance of deterrent and diplomatic efforts to 
mitigate risk of escalation can be found.  
One of the most challenging balancing acts will be to achieve sophisticated, high-end deterrence 
without escalating the conflict and actively accelerating the cyber arms race. Nation states will 
need to make credible claims about their capabilities in the digital sphere to deter adversaries, 
while building trust and confidence to ensure that their adversaries know they will not launch a 
preemptive attack and will not strike without an independent international authority assessing 
and attributing the attack. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the political discourse on cyber weapons and its implications for new types of warfare in the 
international arena, there are various approaches, ranging from cyber deterrence strategies to 
bilateral and multilateral treaties to prevent attacks. While international and regional 
organizations focus their efforts on drafting confidence-building measures, norms and 
cooperative strategies, military organizations and domestic defense agencies largely emphasize 
deterrence measures and dissuasive tactics. During the Cold War, both deterrence and diplomacy 
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played an enormous role in preventing military and nuclear confrontation. Therefore, deterrence 
and diplomacy should also not be seen as two independently existing methods to prevent a cyber 
war, but should go hand in hand in an effort to prevent cyber conflicts. 
If traditional approaches to deterring, mitigating and diplomatically preventing threats are 
transferred to cyberspace, they need to be adapted to the entirety of complexities of the modern 
cyber era. Historically, a combination of deterrence and diplomacy has been used to deescalate 
conflict in the international arena. Therefore, adopting single aspects of these concepts to cyber 
warfare is not recommendable. Deterrence theory has already been augmented to meet some of 
the new challenges of cyber and information technologies, however, in order to account for the 
realities of conflict in cyberspace, and in order to make well-grounded and informed policy 
recommendations to governments, the intertwined nature of deterrence and international 
diplomacy as well as the intricacies of cross-domain hybrid warfare have to be accounted for. 
It is impossible to keep all the variables in mind at all times, and our analysis limits the scope to 
nation state actors and certain aspects of deterrence theory and international diplomacy. There is 
no grand strategy, no perfect, universal, one-size-fits-all solution, but there can be a vision that 
encompasses a fair amount of sensible strategic actions that can lead to successful deterrence and 
co-operation between nation states in cyberspace. Whether State A leans more towards 
deterrence or diplomacy largely depends on the context and history of the relationship with State 
B. Thus, the variables in both concepts need to be examined on a case-to-case basis. Sometimes, 
deterrence strategies will be predominant, other times diplomacy will be more useful or 
effective. The balance and weight of each variable can shift over time, as the relationship 
between states evolves, improves or deteriorates. It is a fluid and flexible concept. The crucial 
point, however, is that both approaches have to come into play in order to prevent conflict. 
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